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My task in this paper is to alert the reader to a culture war that is raging among 
us right here in Europe. This is not a war between religious fundamentalism 
and Enlightenment, nor between nationalism and global solidarity. It is a war 
we can think of, in Kierkegaardian terms, as the conflict between an aesthetic 
and a moral approach to life. But for the now I would like to present it in more 
concrete, historical terms, as the clash between the spirits of two cultural 
movements or institutions that have coexisted in Europe for five hundred 
years, not always peacefully. What Kierkegaard called ‘the aesthetic’, I see 
embodied in Catholicism; and what he called ‘the moral’ (or ‘ethical’), I 
understand as the spirit of Protestantism. I believe that what I call the 
Protestant spirit began to grow strong and spread in Europe as a result of the 
Reformation, but I will suggest rather than prove this historical claim. Most of 
my efforts will be philosophical, characterizing the two spirits and their 
manifestations.  
In what follows, I will offer some characteristic examples from contemporary 
life of this conflict. I will show how Catholicism, or the ‘aesthetic’ spirit, is 
under attack in our society by Protestantism, or the ‘moral’ or ‘moralistic’ spirit. 
I will take issue with this attack, suggesting that the aesthetic Catholic spirit is 
one of life-affirmation, a force of good; whereas the Protestant or moral spirit 
is a force of life-denial. Here I diverge from Kierkegaard, who placed morality 
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higher than aesthetics on the hierarchy of values. On my side, however, I have 
Nietzsche, who wrote that “it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence 
and the world are eternally justified.”1 I believe I also have on my side the 
common man, who for the most part lives his lives aesthetically, even as the 
philosophers of his society provide no theoretical justification for this way of 
life. Finally, I have many artists and writers on my side, and I will refer in my 
conclusion to one work of fiction in particular to illustrate the Catholic view of 
life. 
 
1. The Catholic Spirit and the Protestant Spirit 
Given the connection I posit between the two spirits or cultures and the two 
strands of Christianity, it might be natural to begin by consulting various 
textual sources in Catholic and Protestant theology and then proceed to 
compare and contrast their doctrines. But that would actually be presumptuous. 
For one of the major differences between these two branches of Christianity 
concerns the roles that doctrine, theory and text play in them. Consider how 
Protestantism advocates for ‘faith alone’—for redemption through belief rather 
than through good works. Protestantism regards the Bible as the sole authority; 
and it calls on Christians to read the Bible for themselves, in the privacy of their 
homes, rather than attending Church, where the priest’s interpretation of a few 
Biblical passages will be just one ingredient of the religious service.  
To get a sense of the spirit of the Catholic church, it will not suffice to consider 
Saint Thomas’ proofs for God’s existence, nor to consult any other written work, 
such as Papal Encyclicals. We should instead seize upon the images and 
practices that are at the center of Catholicism. Now I want to say that the most 
                                                 
 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. W. Kaufman (New York: Modern Library, 
1992), section 5, p. 52, italics in the original 
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prominent image in Catholicism is the Madonna and child, an image that you 
see everywhere in Catholic countries: as cast sculptures looking down at 
passers-by from the corners of houses, as roadside shrines in the country, as 
wooden icons hanging over countless desks, beds and kitchen tables. What 
does this phenomenon tell us about Catholicism? First, it is an example of how 
the Catholic most often encounters the divine or religion through images, or by 
the mediation of some other aesthetic object or experience. Mass is indeed a 
ceremony that appeals to all our senses. We see murals of the saints and hear 
the priests’ chanting; we shake our neighbor’s hand; smell the incense and 
candles and taste the Eucharist. Secondly, Madonnas and other ubiquitous 
icons do not proclaim any kind of thesis. Rather they convey an attitude and 
evoke a mood. The Holy Mother of God often looks straight at us in these 
pictures, with a grave or solemn expression in her face as she holds her precious 
child who will be taken from her prematurely. With minimal emotional cues, 
these images manage to convey the mother’s grief and love. Thirdly, these 
images invite us to engage in a ritual: to cross ourselves before them, or to kneel 
and pray. Catholic worship, I want to say, is first of all experiential and practical, 
not reflective and theoretical. Finally, the central image of Catholicism features 
not the extraordinary terror and sacrifice represented by the crucifix, but rather 
the divine in the midst of the most ordinary and familiar: a mother holding her 
baby in her lap, a scene in which we can all imagine ourselves. This woman is 
neither Goddess nor half-Goddess, but a human being. It is her perfectly 
mundane body, her mundane care, that has borne and keeps nourishing and 
protecting the heavenly child.  
A passage from Kierkegaard’s discussion of tragedy comes to mind. Tragedy 
for Kierkegaard represents the aesthetic approach to life—it is how aesthetes 
deal with suffering. “The tragic,” he writes, “contains something infinitely 
gentle, in human life it is actually an aesthetic analogue to divine grace and 
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mercy, softer than they even, and therefore I want to say that it is a motherly 
love which lulls the troubled one.” The moral view of life, on the other hand, 
“is stern and hard,” he says.2 It introduces the concepts of duty, guilt and 
responsibility as solutions to suffering whereas the aesthetic offers comfort to 
victims and forgiveness to perpetrators. 
Protestantism emerged partly as a rejection of these aesthetic, ceremonial and 
sentimental aspects of Catholicism. Luther considered bells and church 
ornaments harmless but useless. 3  And while early on he defended the 
educational value of images depicting Biblical stories, he later wrote that it 
would be better to display no such pictures, as they invite idolatry.4 Calvin was 
more staunch in his opposition to religious imagery, which he thought 
breached both the First and the Second Commandments.5 The only subjects 
appropriate for depiction, he wrote, are those that also in reality are visible to 
us.6 Furthermore he largely rejected the sacraments, retaining only baptism and 
communion; and as for communion, he insisted that the bread and wine are 
mere symbols. They are not actually transubstantiated into flesh and blood by 
the priest’s blessing at the altar. The wine is still wine, the bread still bread. We 
do commune with the divine at communion, but not in virtue of eating and 
drinking the bread and the wine. Rather, he posited that the Spirit of the Lord 
is present during the sacrament.7 Nonetheless, the theologies of both Luther 
and Calvin make a sharper distinction than does Catholicism between soul and 
body, heaven and earth, sacred and mundane; and with these divisions, the 
                                                 
 
2 Kierkegaard, Either/Or Part I, trans. H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 
145 (translation amended) 
3 Martin Luther, Martin Luther’s Basic Theological Writings, ed. by T. F. Lull and W. R. Russell 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2012), p. 78 
4 Luther, p. 78; 511f. 
5 T. H. L. Parker, Calvin: An Introduction to His Thought (New York: Continuum, 1995), p. 29 
6 Parker, p. 30, referring to Calvin xi.12. 
7 Parker, p. 157, refers to Calvin xvii.10 
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idea that art can be revelation, that sensuous and aesthetic experiences can have 
religious significance is lost. The result is a much more abstract and cerebral 
Christianity. God is the object of an intellectual faith and a reverence displayed 
through asceticism and self-discipline. It certainly has a practical dimension, 
but a theory precedes this practice.  
What is ‘moral’ or ‘moralistic’ in Protestantism can be gleaned from its critique 
of Catholicism. Specifically, in questioning the authority of the Pope and clergy, 
Protestantism trusts every man to be able to interpret Scripture for himself, and 
more generally to be able to think and judge for himself. Basic modern moral 
values of individual autonomy and equality among men is evident here. The 
preoccupation with truth and falsehood and the search for an authentic faith, 
are also essentially moral, insofar as they are attempts to avoid deception. The 
Protestant rejection of aesthetics derives from its suspicion of natural human 
inclinations, like our love of beauty; as well as of aesthetic experiences 
orchestrated by men. These are especially vicious if they move participants to 
great passions and moods, since at best such experiences are mere bodily 
happenings that do not put us in touch with anything spiritual; at worst, they 
are temptations from the devil.  
Max Weber notes this as part of elaborating on the ascetic element in 
Protestantism.8 Not only, he writes, is Protestantism opposed to art posing as 
religion; but Calvin and especially the Puritan movement was from the start 
suspicious of art more generally.9 What Weber regards as the bearing pillars of 
Protestantism—self-reflection, self-discipline and work—together serve to turn 
the individual away from frivolous pleasures in the outside world, such as the 
                                                 
 
8 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism, trans. G. C. Wells (New York: 
Penguin, 2002), p. 78 
9 Weber, p. 113 
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theater. It does so partly by directing his attention to his own spiritual condition, 
partly by training him to resist temptation and pleasure, and finally by offering 
him, in the form of a job, a distraction from desire.10 But now, let me turn to a 
consideration of the Thirty Years’ War in our time. 
 
2. The Thirty Years’ War Today 
If we want to get a sense of how the Catholic and Protestant spirits clash in 
modern times, we must first look at the contemporary attitude to aesthetics. 
You will have heard the laments of how we supposedly live in the age of the 
cult of beauty, a superficial age in which appearances are all that matter. But 
from my perspective, this way of objecting to beauty, the reflexive suspicion of 
appearances as mere appearances, is symptomatic of a cultural sickness. Exhibit 
Number One originally comes from the United States—the country that started 
out as a refuge for Protestants; it is the Pepsi Challenge. This was a campaign 
by Pepsi that challenged people to take a blind test of Pepsi Cola and Coca-
Cola. Pepsi was betting that when presented only with the bare flavor of Pepsi, 
consumers would prefer that beverage to Coke, showing that Coca-Cola 
enjoyed its great success thanks only to its PR, which had somehow managed 
to sell people on an illusion. Now what interests us is the view of sensory and 
aesthetic experience presupposed by this campaign. Most obviously, a 
beverage is meant to appeal to the sense of taste. The campaign implicitly 
opposes any influence on this gustatory experience from other senses or 
background knowledge. Having a drink, by this logic, is at best a bodily 
pleasure. 
Most of the time, however, experience is not as simple as this. First of all, 
perceptual experience forms a complex whole, with input from all our senses 
                                                 
 
10 Weber, e.g. pp. 80-83, though this argument is developed over the course of the whole book. 
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mixing and conditioning each other. As Sartre put it, the yellow of a lemon is 
sour. Moreover, other, non-sensory factors influence perceptual experience as 
well. You can enjoy the smell of truffle oil if it comes to you from a plate of 
pasta with truffle sauce, even though by itself it smells much like car fuel, 
which is not something you find appetizing. The impact on experience of the 
way in which it is framed for us—the way we conceptualize its object, and what 
associations are triggered in us—is enormous. Now setting aside the question 
whether as a bare flavor, Coke tastes better than Pepsi, it is clear that Coca-Cola 
triggers different associations than Pepsi does. Coke has an aura of coolness, 
and coolness is an aesthetic concept or experience. In its campaign, Pepsi 
implied that Coke’s coolness is an illusion. Not by proving Coke not to be cool, 
but by undercutting the reality or value of aesthetic experience as such. Though 
Protestant asceticism rejects frivolous bodily pleasures like that of drinking 
unhealthy sugary drinks, its dismissal of the religious experience produced by 
bells, candles and incense is the same denial of aesthetics as the one we find in 
the Pepsi campaign. And this rejection of aesthetics is really an 
impoverishment of experience, an impoverishment of our relation to the world.  
Due to research on implicit biases, the general wariness about the framing of 
experience has been heightened since the days of the Pepsi challenge, and the 
idea that if drinking Coke rather than Pepsi makes you feel cool, then you are 
the advertiser’s fool, is an idea that persists stubbornly, nagging us. Most of us 
have internalized the idea that advertising is something bad, an infringement 
on our autonomy. But actually, we have a great deal to be thankful for to the 
institution of advertising. In exchange for paying a little more for a product, 
advertising helps us take a greater enjoyment in that product by framing our 
experience, injecting it with a certain vibe, a certain mood; giving it a certain 
meaning. Thanks to advertising, something as banal as drinking sugared 
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carbonated water can be elevated to a rush, making you feel a little bit better 
about yourself, about your day. 
Now let us consider a type of conflict of which Europe has seen many examples 
in the last couple of decades. Usually, these are presented as clashes between 
tradition or religion on the one hand and Enlightenment liberalism on the other. 
I am thinking of the proposal in Germany and elsewhere to ban circumcision 
of newborn boys, and the restrictions on headscarves in France. Let France and 
its headscarves be Exhibit Number Two.  
France is of course a predominantly Catholic country, though its Catholic 
population is much more secular than that of Italy or Poland. It also prides itself 
on a far-reaching law separating state and religion. Upon a review of this law 
in 2003, its application to the display of religious symbols by students and 
teachers in public schools was clarified. Now a distinction was made between 
so-called “discrete” religious symbols, which were to be allowed, and so-called 
“conspicuous” ones, which could not be worn in public schools. A small 
pendant in the form of a cross or Star of David counted as “discrete,” whereas 
large crosses, skullcaps and headscarves were to be considered 
“conspicuous.”11  
The French ideal of a separation between church and state is usually said to 
date back to the French Revolution and, more generally, to be an 
Enlightenment idea.12 But actually, the idea dates back to the Reformation. 
Calvin, a Frenchman, insisted that a civil government and a religious 
government (in other words, the Church) could and must coexist harmoniously. 
                                                 
 
11 ‘La laïcité et l’école’ in La Documentation française, 
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/dossiers/d000095-laicite-les-debats-100-ans-apres-la-loi-de-
1905/la-laicite-et-l-ecole, accessed 13 September 2017. 
12 ‘Histoire de la laïcité en France ’ in Wikipedia, 
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Histoire_de_la_laïcité_en_France.  
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The two types of government are distinguished from another by their different 
jurisdictions. The Church is concerned with our eternal souls; civil government, 
meanwhile, presides over all that concerns man as a finite, earthly creature.13 
Relatedly, religious toleration was first widely instituted in Europe through the 
Peace Treaty of Westphalia, which marked the defeat of the Roman Empire’s 
attempt to subjugate Protestant territories and force Catholicism on their 
populations.14 Now on one way of interpreting this, the Protestant struggle for 
religious toleration and freedom, and the separation of Church and state, was 
not so much the struggle for a universal principle as the use of a principle to 
safeguard Protestants’ ability to practice their own alternative version of 
Christianity without fear of persecution. Yet there are reasons to think that a 
separation between Church and state was not just a pragmatic aspiration on 
the part of the Protestants, but a principle rooted deep in their religion, and 
flowing organically from their notion of religiosity as something inner, 
something between the individual and God, invisible to others. In fact, this 
Protestant view of religion yields a separation between religion and culture—a 
view on which religion is not part of culture and its expressions are not cultural 
expressions. This non-cultural idea of religion, probably more than the ideal of 
separating religious and civil authorities, seems to me to be at work in the 
French law on secularism in public schools, particularly in its understanding of 
what constitutes a conspicuous religious symbol. A Muslim headscarf has a 
religious meaning, to be sure. According to one theory, it symbolizes a partition 
in the Prophet Mohammad’s house behind which his wives were hidden from 
visitors’ view, so as to remain inviolate by the gazes of other men. To wear a 
headscarf is then to represent oneself as a bride of the Prophet, or more 
                                                 
 
13 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, pp. 899-900 and more generally Ch. 20 
14 ‘Peace of Westphalia’ in Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/event/Peace-of-
Westphalia, accessed 5 September 2017 
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generally, to adopt that same protection against the gazes of strangers that was 
afforded the Prophet’s wives.  
Of course, there is a particular notion of womanhood, female sexuality and how 
it differs from male sexuality, built into this practice of concealment. Even if 
these notions of female and male, feminine and masculine, can be anchored in 
a religious doctrine or mythology, they are also cultural. The idea that the 
female body is sacred and ought to be revered and enjoy special protection is 
found in many cultures and has a social meaning and social function, quite 
aside from whether or not it is also connected to a religious myth or divine 
commandment. We might call the headscarf a ‘thick’ symbol, contrasting it 
with ‘thin’ symbols like a cross worn on a necklace. Unlike such a cross, the 
headscarf is not only a sign, but part of a way of life, a cultural and social self-
conception. By covering her hair, a woman frames herself in a particular way 
to others, and also to herself. Furthermore it is a piece of clothing, perhaps an 
accessory, that can serve an aesthetic function, as adornment. This 
intermingling of religious, social and cultural meaning is relatively alien to 
Protestantism. But it pervades Islam, Judaism, Catholicism and Orthodox 
Christianity, and to categorize a headscarf exclusively as a religious symbol is 
to ignore cultural meaning in a characteristically Protestant way. On the most 
generous interpretation, the French law betrays a flatfooted ignorance about 
what culture is. On a more damning one, it amounts to cultural nihilism: a 
denial that culture is real or valuable.  
Exhibit Number Three concerns the prevalent contemporary argument to the 
effect that we buy too much stuff and fetishize material possessions. This 
tendency in our society gets labeled variously ‘consumerism’ and ‘materialism’, 
and under these headings gets lumped together with our readiness to throw 
things away once they’ve outlived their usefulness, regarding material objects 
in a purely utilitarian way. Of course, throwing things away is connected to 
Ulrika Carlsson 
   11 
buying things in that we need to first acquire material possessions in order to 
be able to put them in the garbage. There is indeed a mindset, an attitude to 
material things, that manifests itself equally in the ease with which we purchase 
new stuff and the ease with which we throw them away. And ‘consumerism’ 
seems like an appropriate label for this mindset. It reflects a lack of reverence 
for material things, due perhaps to a lack of reverence for nature. It seems to 
view the material world instrumentally, as a resource to be exploited for our 
ends. This is how Weber’s analyzes the Protestant view of matter in his 
discussion of the difference between Protestant and Catholic approaches to 
production. According to Weber, manufacturers in Germany noted with 
frustration how their Catholic employees were unable to adopt new methods 
of crafting objects, ways of handling the material that differed from the ones 
they were used to. Assuring them that the new methods were more efficient 
and less straining on the worker’s body did not faze them. Their craftsmanship, 
I want to suggest, was based on a more intimate relation with their materials, 
ingrained in the movements of their hands, and tied up with their sense of the 
material’s essence, and the meaning of the thing to be forged out of it. To 
change their craftsmanship, they would have had to disregard this meaning of 
the object, its identity, and look more abstractly at their materials and the work 
process, regarding them as just means to some external end, rather than as a 
sort of ongoing relationship with an inherent value.  
Now if we consider not the production but the acquisition and keeping of such 
material objects, we can construe a concomitant Catholic attitude to the 
acquisition and keeping of material objects. Like the Catholic approach to 
manufacturing, it is not utilitarian. And its corollary is not the ability to throw 
things away lightheartedly. It leads rather to a tendency to fetishize material 
things; that is, to revere them and regard them as imbued with meaning, even 
treating them anthropomorphically as unique individuals that cannot be 
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replaced, with whom we have personal relationships, and that testify to our 
past experiences with them as well as the lives we envision living among them 
in the future.  
In his essay “Unpacking My Library,” Walter Benjamin describes his affection 
for his books, and proclaims that for a collector, “ownership is the most 
intimate relationship one can have to an object.”15 This fetishism may have dire 
environmental consequences when multiplied on a large scale, but as a 
character trait, it is not subject to the same criticism as the attitude behind the 
behavior for which I think we ought to reserve the label ‘consumerism’. Yet in 
the critique of this fetishism or reverence, we hear the echo of the Protestant 
rejection of attachment to material things and sensuous enjoyment—the idea 
that matter may be exploited for our needs but cannot be worshipped. The 
asceticism that Catholicism requires only of those who have chosen monastic 
life, Protestantism generalizes as the lifestyle ideal for everyone. In the 
accusation, for example, that the booming interest in interior decoration, 
fashion, and food is a symptom of our superficiality and frivolity, we hear 
again the Protestant founders’ rejection not only of sensuous indulgence, but 
also their insistence that candles and bells are redundant for mass, that art 
cannot reveal the divine, and that the Eucharist is not really the body of Christ.  
The result of this sharp separation between spirit and matter is really a 
profound alienation of people from earthly existence, a shattering of any hope 
that the material world can be a home for us in some profound way. And 
conversely, the prevalence of religious art in Catholicism, the care with which 
churches are decorated and the effort made during religious services to induce 
a certain mood in the participants—these aspects of Catholicism amount to an 
                                                 
 
15 Walter Benjamin, “Unpacking My Library” in his Illuminations (New York: Harcourt, 1969), 
p. 67 
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encouragement of our natural inclination to find meaning in material objects 
and sensuous experiences, to see spirit and flesh as united. Ultimately, they 
serve to reconcile us to earthly existence, to feel at home in the world. This deep 
spiritual comfort is what is lost when Protestantism dispels what Benjamin 
called the aura that previously surrounded not only the kinds of magical 
objects used in rituals—such as relics, icons, and the Eucharist—but also 
photographs and works of art;16 when it insists that wine is just wine, bread is 
just bread. The result is, as Nietzsche would later put it, that “A stone is more 
of a stone now.”17  
 
3. The Brute Good 
The Protestant mindset as I have characterized it is essentially reflective. It does 
not leave things be as they are, is not satisfied with immediate impressions of 
things but inquires into things. This takes place as part of a pursuit of justification, 
an attempt to establish true and false, right and wrong. Kierkegaard regarded 
autonomous reflection, and the search for the true and the right through 
reflection, as Socrates’ contribution to human culture. If this belief in every 
individual’s ability to find truth through reflection lay in hibernation during 
the Middle Ages, I want to suggest that it was awoken not only by Descartes, 
but equally by Luther and Calvin. If Socrates was ‘the founder of morality’, I 
want to say that Luther and Calvin founded modern moralism.  
What is wrong with moralism, with the emphasis on reflection and justification 
in ethical life, is that the things that give meaning to life, that offer a bit of 
redemption in this life, are not always easy to justify. When something strikes 
us as good, it often does so in a brute way. That is why the part of ethical life 
                                                 
 
16 Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” in his Illuminations. 
17 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human All Too Human, #218, emphasis added 
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that is concerned not with rights and obligations, but with ends—with the 
Good—is better treated in literature than in philosophy. When we feel great joy 
or awe or love or meaning—aesthetic experiences, by Kierkegaard’s lights, but 
with an ethical and spiritual depth he sometimes denied—we can express 
ourselves only in a kind of pidgin. We name the things that enchant us, we point 
to them, but to explain why we should be so enchanted, to extract the good from 
them in terms of concepts—this is far more difficult. Virginia Woolf captures 
this inarticulateness of our encounter with the Good in her narration of Clarissa 
Dalloway’s thoughts and experiences as she goes out to buy flowers: “in the 
triumph and the jingle and the strange high singing of some aeroplane 
overhead was what she loved; life; London; this moment in June.”18  
By reducing aesthetic experience to pleasure, and rejecting pleasure as 
something trite and primitive; by purging religion of aesthetic and affective 
elements; and finally by separating religion from culture, Protestantism has 
done a disservice both to religion and to culture. For not only do we end up 
with an exceedingly formal, ethereal and prosaic religion; but by being denied 
any real connection to the sacred, aesthetic or ‘hedonistic’ values have come to 
be thought of as trite and vulgar. And yet in our naïve, immediate experience 
of the world, there are moments of enchantment that blur any distinction 
between secular and religious. It should not occur to us to accuse Clarissa 
Dalloway of either blasphemy or romantic hyperbole when we hear her 
imagine the answer she ought to give when asked why she’s always giving 
these parties—to bask in her own social status? She cannot hope that her 
answer will be understood, Woolf writes; and yet it is the only answer she can 
give: “They’re an offering.”19  
                                                 
 
18 Virginia Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway (London: Vintage, 2000), p. 2 
19 Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway, p. 107 
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